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GAMES MULTINATIONALS PLAY IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT 
SYSTEM 
 
Alex Jettinghoff* 
 
Abstract 
The paper explores the ways in which multinationals try to make the European patent sytem 
work for them. Creative patenting and strategic litigation are established and successful tools 
of these Repeat Players. However, during the struggle about the formation of an EU patent 
system they appear to have met their match in some other Repeat Players, especially some 
powerful Member States. The role of patent legal experts is highlighted. 
 
Key words 
Multinationals and European patents, patenting strategies, strategic litigation, European judi-
cial cooperation, Unitary Patent & UPC, patent legal experts 
1. Introduction 
Patent law has long been a marginal legal topic, an arcane specialism of a 
small community of legal experts. This state of affairs changed considerably 
when (in the 1980s) the U.S. started to place ‘property-rights’ at the centre of 
its economic policy of industrial innovation.1 Subsequently, economic globaliza-
tion has made patenting a key competitive instrument of many multinational 
corporations, as in e.g. the chemical, pharmaceutical, automotive and electron-
ics industries. Granted patents can be worth billions and thus invite conflicts be-
tween competing corporations, resulting in an increasing volume of litigation. In 
Europe, interest in patenting and patent litigation has experienced a similar 
increase, creating rewarding opportunities for scholars and a variety of legal 
practitioners.  
Multinationals (being the exemplary Repeat Players2) will be inclined to 
exploit all opportunities current patent regimes around the world have to offer 
to exploit their patents (or to attack those of others). The focus of this paper is 
the games multinationals play in the European patent system. The current pat-
ent system in Europe offers interesting opportunities for such games.  
Acquiring a patent in Europe probably is not very different from proce-
dures elsewhere. Within the framework of the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) of 1973, a corporation that wants an invention patented can apply for 
                                         
*  Alex Jettinghoff is research fellow at the Law Faculty of the Radboud Universiteit Nijme-
gen. 
1  Jaffe 2000. 
2  Galanter 1983, or more appropriately ‘artificial persons’: Galanter 2006. 
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the grant of a patent, which is valid in the Contracting States that have joined 
the EPC. The application is directed at and thoroughly scrutinized by the ad-
ministrative section of the European Patent Organization (the European Patent 
Office – EPO – in Munich). The EPO conducts a ‘search’ and ‘examination’ to 
establish whether the claimed invention is new (there is no ‘prior art’), whether 
the invention involved an inventive step and is susceptible of industrial applica-
tion. Within a period of nine months anyone can oppose the validity of a 
granted European patent (on a limited number of grounds) with one of the 
Opposition Divisions of EPO. When the Opposition Division finds the opposition 
admissible, the patentee can react to the grounds of opposition and even 
amend his patent. Hearing of the parties may take place before a decision is 
made. The patent is then either maintained (amended or not) or revoked.  
A European peculiarity concerns the litigation phase. When a patent is 
granted, the firm obtains a ‘European patent’. It is a so-called ‘bundle patent’, 
which means that the patent is valid in all Member States of the European Pat-
ent Convention that the patentee has designated during its application for the 
patent. The validity of patents and patent infringement both have to be con-
tested in national courts.3 An important consequence of this system is that the 
examination if validity or infringement issues are the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
national courts of the countries where the patent is registered. Since there is no 
final European judicial authority, for patentees (or those that want to challenge 
a patent) this often means that they have to start litigation in multiple jurisdic-
tions to protect their patents or to contest the validity of those of competitors. 
This system appears to make little sense in a common market and, indeed, a 
unitary patent and jurisdiction within the framework of the EU has been in the 
making for decades. Also this trajectory of European legislation offers an op-
portunity for big business to try to mend the new system to their preferences.  
The Munich patenting procedure, the patent courts in the countries of Eu-
rope and the EU legislature in Brussels are legal arenas where particularly mul-
tinational corporations throw their weight around, consolidating and promoting 
their considerable interests. They will be observed using the possibilities of the 
system to the hilt, displaying all the capabilities Galanter attributed to ideal 
typical ‘Repeat Players’. Although these practices are often only known to in-
siders, some research is available that makes these ‘games’ a little more trans-
parent to a wider audience. In essence this is a small study of the power of 
multinationals, its potential and its limits within the three arenas mentioned: the 
                                         
3  A patent can be challenged before a national court, during the EPO opposition proceed-
ings or after the patent is maintained. When an EPO opposition procedure is in progress, 
some courts are obliged to stay proceedings until the EPO procedure is concluded (e.g. 
Germany). In other countries the court has discretion to allow validity proceedings to 
proceed or to stay proceedings pending opposition in Munich (e.g. United Kingdom, 
Netherlands). 
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patenting procedure in Munich, the patent courts in the countries of Europe and 
the EU legislature in Brussels.  
2. Sources 
This paper draws mainly on three sources. The first is a report from the Euro-
pean Commission of its investigation into the patent practices in the pharma-
ceutical industry.4 The second is a research paper on the caseload of the Pa-
tent Section of the District Court in The Hague (Netherlands) and on the outlook 
of its judges, of patent lawyers and litigating firms on the work and settings of 
the Patent Section.5 And the third is a reconstruction of the history of the long 
quest for a European Union patent system.6 
3. The patenting game 
Understandably, corporations are very secretive about operations that they 
consider to be of strategic importance. This normally means that information 
concerning their patenting practices is hard come by, unless on some rare occa-
sion insiders or authorities reveal them. Some years ago, one such occasion oc-
curred, when the European Commission published an investigation into patent 
practices in the pharmaceutical industry. Their report sheds some light on how 
big pharma tries to make the most of the patenting procedures of the European 
Patent Organization. These findings will be reported shortly, but first some 
elementary information on how competition in this industry works. 
War in pharma land 
The pharmaceutical industry can be divided into two sections. A larger part of 
the industry consists of ‘innovative’ (‘originator’, ‘brand’) drug producers, i.e. 
corporations that develop and exploit drugs they have invented. To this cate-
gory belong some household names as Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Roche 
and various others.7 They form a group of giant global corporations with year-
ly sales ranging from 60 to 30 billion dollars. For these firms, patents have be-
come of eminent importance. Patents are temporary monopolies, granted and 
protected by the government, for the exploitation of inventions such as drugs in 
exchange for disclosure of the invention. The reasoning behind this institution is 
that patents allow the inventors to regain the expenses made for their inven-
tion, in exchange for sharing its secrets. Usually, the fact that big pharmaceuti-
cal firms focus on ailments that have a wide prevalence (blockbusters) is ex-
                                         
4  European Commission 2009. 
5  Jettinghoff 2010. The research project was part of a larger project commissioned by the 
Dutch Council for the Judiciary, concerning five instances of judicial specialization. 
6  Jettinghoff 2011. 
7  Source: Fischer & Breitenbach 2007, 18. 
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plained by referring to the huge developing costs.8 The hunt for blockbusters 
by means of mergers and acquisitions is also the driving force behind the con-
solidation of the industry, resulting in the circle of pharma giants.  
A smaller part of the industry consists of so-called ‘generic’ firms, i.e. cor-
porations that produce drugs that have run out of patent. They also are global 
corporations like Teva, Sandoz, Merck and Ratiopharm.9 Their total sales are 
generally a factor 10 smaller than those of the ‘innovative’ firms.  
According to insiders the competition in this industry is rather fierce, some-
times likened to economic warfare. The steps to be made in the development of 
new drugs, like research, scientific publications, clinical trials, registration, pa-
tenting and marketing, appear all as frontlines for competitive contestation – 
not only between innovative firms, but also between innovative and generic 
firms.10 Here we will consider the way in which patenting can be an instrument 
in this clash of giants.  
Patenting tricks of the trade 
Of course, the big pharma corporations use the European patenting facilities in 
a regular way, as it was intended, but more than occasionally they try to go 
beyond that. How they do this has been revealed in some detail in 2009 in a 
sector inquiry by the DG Competition, a department of the European Commis-
sion, the EU bureaucracy.11 One ploy is the so-called ‘patent thicket’ and is 
used by innovative firms to protect their patents against an invalidation attack 
from generic firms.12 This is done by applying for a great number of patents 
for effective ingredients that come close to the one that is patented or that add 
something to the base patent (different dosages, other applications or addi-
tives). This makes the outcome of the invalidation attempt of the generic firms 
insecure.  
Another ploy is called the creation of ‘divisionals’, i.e. when an applicant 
splits off a number of narrower patents applications from the parent patent 
application. When it is created, the divisional can stay alive on its own. Even 
when the parent application is refused, each individual divisional application 
has to be assessed.13 
A last example of the patent ploys used by the innovative industry is called 
‘evergreening’ (see the figure below).  
                                         
8  In reality these costs are dwarfed by the recourses spent on marketing. 
9  Fischer & Breitenbach 2007, 25. 
10  See generally: Goldacre 2012. 
11  European Commission 2009. 
12  Op.cit., 185. 
13  Op.cit., 192. 
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This means that when a drug begins to run out of patent, the patentee tries to 
prolong the duration of the monopoly by giving a twist to the original effective 
ingredient in the drug (different dosage, another application or an additive) 
and then trying to secure a new patent for it. Of course, such a move, if suc-
cessful, stands to earn the company a great deal of money. Also it is detrimen-
tal to the generic companies who could have taken over production (and to 
patients who otherwise would have to pay less for the drugs). Consequently, 
the generic producers tend to go into opposition with the Board of Appeal in 
Munich and if this fails, usually litigation is the next step. 
Similar tactics seem to be used in other parts of the world, but not always 
with success. In 2013 for instance, the Indian Supreme Court supported an ear-
lier decision to deny a patent for a cancer drug (Gleevec) applied for by the 
Swiss innovator Novartis, reasoning that that the claimed patent lacked novelty 
and enhanced efficacy.14 Patient associations in India applauded the decision, 
stating that this meant that generic firms were allowed to continue to sell the 
drug for less than one-tenth of the price Novartis normally asks.  
Opposition 
A patent expert from a multinational food producer explained that computers 
constantly monitor the EPO data about new patents in their sector. When pa-
tents come dangerously close to a patent of the firm, the new patent is at-
tacked in the opposition procedure. Approximately 10% of the patents 
                                         
14  See: http://ipkitten.blogspot.nl/2013/04/public-health-and-ip-in-india-novartis.html. 
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granted by EPO are opposed. The prevalence of opposition increases with pa-
tent value and in areas where large patent portfolios are held.15 These are 
indications for a strong presence of multinationals in the opposition procedures. 
This looks like an interesting topic for further exploration. 
4. Playing the court facilities  
From the perspective of the multinational corporations patent litigation is often 
a ‘global’ campaign, managed by a team at corporate level. This team de-
cides on the strategy to be followed, concerning the argumentation and the 
selection of jurisdictions.16 
Strategic litigation 
Selecting a jurisdiction needs special attention in Europe, because – as men-
tioned before – for decades there has been no unitary patent jurisdiction 
available. Patents have been defended or challenged in national jurisdictions. 
This condition has offered opportunities for forum shopping, depending on the 
requirements of the case.  
When the chances for winning the case look good, a few national jurisdic-
tions with a large national market and with a judiciary of good reputation are 
selected (usually Germany, UK, France and the Netherlands among them).17 
The idea is that success in these jurisdictions is enough to scare off infringements 
in other countries. Sometimes, litigation is started in succession (a kind of ‘litiga-
tion wave’), in the hope that a positive outcome in the first case will have a pos-
itive influence on the next ones. When the outcome is more uncertain, one can 
choose a small market as a test case or opt for a jurisdiction with a slight bias 
(e.g. pro patentee or pro domestic corporations) that might favor the plaintiff. 
Also the need for speed can inform the selection of countries, because not all 
countries provide facilities for speedy procedures.18  
In the case that a competitor accuses a corporation of patent infringement, 
the latter can choose for a preemptive action. A famous example is the so-
called ‘Italian torpedo’.19 The clue of this action is the slow pace of some juris-
dictions, particularly Italy. The corporation files for a declaration of non-
infringement with the appropriate court in Italy. This case is then expertly pro-
crastinated and in the mean time the courts of other countries, where infringe-
ment proceedings can be initiated, have to stay proceedings until the Italian 
                                         
15  Harhoff & Reitzig 2004. 
16  Jettinghoff 2010. 
17  The sector inquiry of DG Competition reports an average of 5 countries. 
18  Speedy proceeding are available by France and the Netherlands. 
19  Franzosi 1997, 2002. 
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court has reached a decision. In this way the cases in other countries can remain 
undecided for years on end and thus ‘torpedoed’. 
Unanimously, industry (multinationals as well as SMEs) and patent legal ex-
perts deplore the lack of a unitary patent and patent jurisdiction in Europe. The 
system is not only expensive for its users, it is also possible that judges in dif-
ferent countries have come to opposing conclusions in the same case. To prevent 
this risk, the European patent judges have done what judges do in such circums-
tances: they have co-operated.20 Starting in 1982, the European patent judges 
come together in Munich every year to discuss difficult cases to harmonize their 
decision-making. A side effect of these meetings has been that the European 
patent judges have developed excellent international relations. They are in-
formed about each other’s decisions and if cases are submitted simultaneously 
in various jurisdictions, contacting colleagues is not uncommon. These judges 
have even founded an association (‘International Patent Judges Association’) 
that was to play an active role in the formation of the unitary patent and pa-
tent jurisdiction. 
Enforcement 
A caseload analysis of the Patent Section of the District Court in the Hague re-
vealed a relatively large number of summary proceedings on the docket, al-
most 75% of them filed by the same Italian plaintiff and Dutch law firm.21 The 
judges, asked about these cases, dismissed them as irrelevant – mainly because 
they often ended with an in absentia verdict – but had heard that an electron-
ics firm was behind these cases. The Dutch electronics firm was not hard to trace 
and its patents and standard department happily confessed to employing this 
Italian firm, in order to protect their rights (based on a standard for sound 
technology) against piracy.22 This Italian entity raided electronics fairs in Ams-
terdam and searched containers in Rotterdam, looking for unlicensed products 
using this particular technology. Detected equipment was seized and - after 
filing a case - released if the pirate had agreed to a license or otherwise – 
after acquiring a court order - destroyed. The in-house lawyer of the electron-
ics firm was very satisfied with the revenues that resulted from these activi-
ties.23 
                                         
20  Breier 1983, Brinkhoff 1997. 
21  Jettinghoff 2010. 
22  This can be done on the basis of the EU Anti-piracy Regulation of 2003. 
23  This might be an example of in-house counsel in the role of entrepreneur, a category 
suggested by Nelson & Nielsen 2000. 
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5. Changing the rules: the EU solution 
The story of the Community patent system cannot be easily told in a condensed 
form because it covers a long time, knows a dialectical development and is 
complicated by behind-the-scenes bureau-political maneuvering. For more then 
forty years, efforts have been made to establish a European Community patent 
and patent jurisdiction. Time and again the initiative stranded and time and 
again the plan was rekindled. One might conclude that international business 
had little influence on this dossier, but matters are not that simple.  
The plans for a European patent (the current ‘bundle patent’) and a Com-
munity patent have been in competition since the founding of the European 
Economic Community. It appears that particularly France has had its hands on 
the switchboard. On the outset of the Common Market in 1958, the European 
Commission had suggested the creation of a Community patent system. ‘Indu-
strialists’, keen on better patent system, reportedly endorsed this initiative.24 
The resulting draft of the Community Patent Convention (CPC) in 1962 met with 
fundamental disagreements between Member States. An important issue was 
that some (notably France) were adamant that the system should be limited to 
the countries of the EEC, while others (notably the Netherlands, mindful of its 
Anglo-Dutch corporations Shell and Unilever) insisted the system to be open to 
European countries that were not participants in the Common Market (members 
of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA)). Lacking unanimity, initiatives 
along this track came to naught and the prospects for a European patent sys-
tem remained bleak until 1968. 
A new window opened as an indirect result of the plans for a Patent Co-
operation Treaty (PCT) looked to become successful. This worldwide treaty 
(drafted under strong US ‘guidance’) proposed to upgrade patents in the Con-
tracting States by requiring search and examination reports to accompany pa-
tent applications. These reports would be provided by a limited number of In-
ternational Searching Authorities. The hitch was that some countries (like France) 
did not require the national patent office to examine patentability and had no 
facilities for such examinations. Thus France would be forced to grant a large 
number of applications coming from the PCT system without having the facilities 
to examine patentability in order to filter these PCT applications. This prospect 
made the French government bolt into action, to ensure that PCT applications 
would be examined by a European Patent Office before they would be 
granted. It took up the old CPC-track and solved earlier problems by rallying 
sufficient support for a split of the 1962 draft CPC into (1) a proposal for a 
European patent office and patent granting procedure, which became the 
1973 European Patent Convention (EPC), which could be joined by European 
                                         
24  Kranakis 2007. 
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Community Member States and EFTA states alike, and (2) a proposal for a 
Community Patent Convention (CPC) on top of that EPC, to arrange for a com-
mon patent for the Community states only.  
The EPC came into force in 1977. In the mean time, the Community pursued 
its efforts to reach an agreement on the CPC by means of successive intergo-
vernmental conferences in Luxemburg. The intention was that the integration of 
the patent system would be completed with a unitary patent and a common 
court of appeal. Eventually, these efforts proved unsuccessful.25 That was a 
crucial moment for the fate of the Community patent regime, because the alter-
native - more intergovernmental – patent regime quickly started to become 
entrenched. Within a decade, more than half of the patent applications depo-
sited in Europe were addressed to the EPO, bypassing the national patent of-
fices. 
A consequence of this entrenchment was that the forces around patent 
practice in Europe developed into two opposing coalitions. On the one hand we 
find the champions of a EU-solution. First among these is France, supported by 
the EC (and later the EP).26 The motives of the European institutions seem rather 
transparent, because after all the EU is their mission. The motives of France 
however are not so transparent. Why has it pursued this agenda over so many 
years with such tenacity? It has always presented itself as a principled cham-
pion of the Community solution. One suspects an ulterior motive, but can only 
guess about its nature. The data suggest that the European patent system was 
diverging too much from the French geopolitical strategy to give the Community 
(perceived as extension of France) a strong position in the world and especially 
in relation to the United States. This motive surfaced earlier at the occasion of 
the PCT negotiations and probably is still be active. 
On the other hand we find important patent countries such as Germany, the 
UK and the Netherlands (supported by industry and patent law experts), cling-
ing to this established European patent system and making the promotion of a 
Community patent system an uphill battle.27 The motives of this EPC coalition 
                                         
25  An agreement was reached, but two of the nine Member States eventually did not ratify 
the convention (Denmark and Ireland because of constitutional objections). Cf. Dorhout 
Mees 1998, p. 20. The Dutch had ended their obstruction of a Community solution be-
cause the UK became a Member State in 1973 and consequently their bi-national corpo-
rations were safe. 
26  The best window of opportunity for this group emerged in 1973 and during the Luxem-
burg conferences just mentioned. 
27  To the frustration of this coalition, an initiative to improve the European patent regime by 
means of a single patent jurisdiction (EPLA) was effectively (and mysteriously) torpedoed 
in 2006, allegedly by a tandem of French and EC policy operators. The bureau-political 
antics displayed by these players are – if true – astonishing (if not hilarious). Fans of 
cloak-and-dagger stories in EU politics will enjoy: Pagenberg 2007. This development 
→ 
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seem fairly straightforward: they demanded serious improvements on the exist-
ing system or else.  
This struggle seems to have run its course in 2012 when an Agreement on a 
Unified Patent Court was signed. Before this happened, several major ob-
stacles had to be skirted. One important issue was the translation costs of a 
Community patent. EU-law requires that all official documents are available in 
all the languages of the Member States. Of course, this would make a Commu-
nity patent very expensive. After a failed attempt in 2003, the advent of the 
Lisbon Treaty agenda of the ‘knowledge economy’ offered a new opportunity. 
A new draft agreement was advanced for consideration in the Council in early 
2009.28 As insiders had hoped, the Council reached an agreement on the main 
features of the future patent system along these lines in December 2009. The 
tricky subject of the translation arrangement was to be resolved in special reg-
ulation. The proposals of the Commission for a language regime presented on 
1 July 2010 met with fierce opposition from Spain and Italy. They were out-
raged by the proposal that the Community Patent system would work accord-
ing to the language arrangement of the (EPC) London Agreement, i.e. that the 
EU patents would be examined and granted in one of the three working lan-
guages: English, French and German. All efforts for a unanimous decision failed 
in November 2010. In despair, a group of 12 countries decided to opt for the 
new possibility of ‘enhanced co-operation’ under the Lisbon Treaty, which 
enables some Member States to implement the new patent regime, while others 
may follow later. In the mean time, all other Member States except Spain and 
Italy have joined the original 12. 
A further delicate issue was the role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). The Community coalition demanded a full involvement of the EU 
jurisdiction in patent litigation, i.e. of the CJEU. This was absolutely unaccepta-
ble for multinational industry and patent legal practice, because they had 
some experience with its involvement in EU trademark law and were not im-
pressed by the results. In extremis, after many skirmishes, a shaky compromise 
was made on this issue.29  
A last sticky issue was the seat of the Court of First Instance. Major con-
tenders were Munich, London and Paris. True to form, also this issue was re-
solved by compromise: the central division of the Court of First Instance will 
                                         
gave the proponents of a EU-solution a new opportunity for action, but now they had to 
reckon with the demands of Germany and the UK.  
28  Council Working Document 7928/09. 
29  The preamble of the Agreement now states that ‘the Unified Patent Court must in particu-
lar cooperate with the CJEU in properly interpreting Union law by relying on the latter’s 
case law and by requesting preliminary rulings in accordance with Article 267 TFEU’. So 
it seems to depend on the Court of First Instance or the Court of Appeal in Luxembourg 
whether the CJEU will be involved or not. Council 16351/12. 
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have its seat (surprisingly) in Paris, with specialised sections in London (human 
necessities and chemistry + metallurgy) and Munich (mechanical engineering, 
lighting, heating, weapons, blasting). The Court was supposed to start on Janu-
ary 2014, but this has been delayed. 
What about the influence of multinational industry? Both big industry and 
SMEs have made their preferences known to decision makers at all levels. The 
European Commission has organized hearings for this purpose and has har-
vested numerous reactions on these occasions. Multinational industry was very 
vocal, not only themselves but also by means of their organizations or their in-
ternational law firms. Their preferences, especially when in agreement, seem to 
have pulled considerable weight with the transnational drafters and decision-
makers.30 We find the preferences of industry and patent practice more or less 
translated especially into the language regime, the position of the CJEU and 
the assurance of the expertise of the judges. But these preferences had to be 
squared with the demands of powerful Member States (like France) and EU 
institutions, which have different objectives than industry. The final compromises, 
e.g. about the rules of procedure, are still in progress.  
6. Concluding remarks 
Multinational firms may not account for most of the patents granted or of pa-
tent litigation, but as frequent users they make a big imprint on the patent sys-
tem in Europe.  
In patenting, the 25 top patent applicants are all multinationals of house-
hold-name status. And they seem most likely to use the opposition procedure to 
protect their patents. The use made of the patenting system by the innovative 
pharma industry seems an extreme case, not so much gameplay as endemic to 
the industry, connected to its business model. The evergreening tactics are re-
ported to serve a marketing strategy aimed at the successful promotion of 
brand loyalty for existing blockbuster drugs. Apparently, this marketing strate-
gy brings in more revenue than is expected from investing in research and de-
velopment.31 That is not to say that other industries are necessarily more scru-
pulous, maybe they just have different business models. 
In patent ligation, big corporations offer an ambiguous picture. In the 599 
patent cases decided during 2002-2007 by the Dutch Patent Court, 27% of 
the plaintiffs and 17% of the defendants were big corporations.32 But the mul-
                                         
30  Also some national positions appear to be informed by several stakeholders, among 
them representatives from industry. The Netherlands offers an example. The Dutch offi-
cial that participates in the Council Working Party regularly consults with a so-called 
‘Commission of 8’, which counts among its members – apart from various legal experts – 
some corporate lawyers from the most prominent multinationals. Jettinghoff 2011. 
31  See: Light & Lexchin 2012; they report a ratio of basic research to marketing of 1:19. 
32  Jettinghoff 2010. 
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tinationals seem to dominate the image of the Court. That was my impression 
when I was invited to witness a hearing in an Actavis vs Novartis trial. In atten-
dance were a big audience (for a private law hearing), bigwig lawyers and 
technical experts, simultaneous translation in English of the hearing (conducted 
in Dutch), two of the three judges were lawyers as well as chemical engineers, 
hearing lasted a whole day – this was a well furnished hearing indeed. One of 
the judges whispered that the stakes of this trial might be half a billion. My 
impression was that the judges had selected this case to show me the real busi-
ness of the patent Court. 
In the quest for a Community patent and patent jurisdiction, big business 
was not among the decision makers. The Member States and the EU institutions, 
serving in this endless dossier as motors and brakes, dominated the whole story. 
However, bid business preferences seriously informed decision-making, al-
though not always in the desired fashion. The new patent system in Europe will 
not end the playing of litigation games by multinationals. The complexity of the 
judicial machinery that has been created probably will offer ample opportuni-
ties for the same and also for new games.  
In conclusion, one suggestion for further research: the patent legal experts. 
They are a collection of patent attorneys, in-house counsel, lawyers, judges and 
professors. They are active in patenting (patent attorneys and lawyers), in liti-
gation (in-house counsel, lawyers, judges and professors) and in European leg-
islation (all) and have definitively an international outlook. Their presence 
around the European political arena was an interesting surprise. The patent law 
experts have a low profile in the high politics of this story, but are very present 
in its ‘low politics’, inside the machine rooms of (national and transnational) 
working groups, expert panels and conferences. We have to be careful not to 
underestimate their influence. Especially, these patent law experts had consi-
derable influence in defining the parameters for the design of a Community 
Patent Litigation arrangement, thus solving issues that otherwise might easily 
have been stumbling blocks for an agreement. They constitute a most interest-
ing epistemic community. 
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